If AIs Can Feel Pain, What Is Our Responsibility Towards Them?
welfarephilosophy
Conor Purcell · 2025 · Essay · Accessible · 16 min read
A beautifully written, historically grounded essay arguing the precautionary principle should be applied to AI suffering. Traces moral exclusion history (Descartes's animals, slavery, Singer's animal liberation) and asks whether AI is the next frontier. Engages Birch's 'zone of reasonable disagreement,' Metzinger's predictive processing account of artificial suffering, Floridi's information ethics, and Sebo's moral circle arguments. The essay's strongest move: grounding AI welfare in the long pattern of moral error rather than treating it as unprecedented.
See Also
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals and AI
Jonathan Birch
Taking AI Welfare Seriously
Robert Long, Jeff Sebo, Patrick Butlin, Kathleen Finlinson, Kyle Fish, Jacqueline Harding, Jacob Pfau, Toni Sims, Jonathan Birch, David Chalmers
AI Wellbeing
Simon Goldstein, Cameron Kirk-Giannini